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THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF HIGH
TREASON IN ENGLAND FROM ITS FEUDAL
ORIGIN TO THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY
FRANK W. HARRIS*
Placed in the context of its historical setting between the Norman Con-
quest of the eleventh century and the advent of the modern age, what fol-
lows is a study of treason in England based on the relationship between law
and economics. The treason dealt with is high treason, that which was di-
rected against the king as sovereign. The adjective "high" generally will be
deleted, but should remain understood. Except in passing, the other forms
of treason (petit or petty treason and misprision of treason) will not be
treated.'
General conclusions are made as warranted by the evidence; conclu-
sions which will be made more compelling or even be overcome as further
research is made based on the extant public, local, and family records. En-
quiry that looks solely into relevant case materials will not suffice if the
interdependence between the law and economics of treason is to be more
fully, if not completely, understood.
I. TREASON: THE CONTRACTUAL SETTING
The law of treason that developed in England grew out of the feudal
relationship between the king as sovereign and lord paramount of the realm
and the populace as vassals and subjects thereof. The origin of this relation-
ship can be traced to a number of disparate sources which pre-date the
* F.W. Harris is an Assistant District Attorney, Nassau County, New York.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Paul H. Brietzke, Professor of Law in
the School of Law, Valparaiso University, for his helpful advice and assistance in the prepara-
tion of this paper. The errors and shortcomings that remain are solely the responsibility of the
author.
I. See infra note 25.
While the non-specialist might recognize the names of Thomas More and Mary Queen of
Scots, reference to less well known individuals has as its purpose the giving of personality and
humanity to the otherwise stark and cold events by pointing out that it was truly real people
who were involved. Reference to individuals such as Augustine Webster and William Freeman
is thus intended by way of example.
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Norman Conquest of 1066.2
The first of these was the Germanic comitatus which was based on the
comradeship between warriors, the brotherhood of the battlefield, as cen-
tered upon the comites (companions) of the princeps (warrior chieftain).'
The obligation of the chief was to provide leadership, victory, and spoils. In
return, he was to receive the chief's share and the rights and privileges of
office. The band of companions ("comes" would become "count" in the me-
dieval feudal hierarchy) gave loyal service in following the commands of
the chief. The relationship, though largely tacit, retained a certain formal-
ity which provided for mutuality of obligation and satisfaction. Implied in
the fulfillment of satisfaction was the requirement of obligation, for without
the latter the former would not have been achieved.'
The second source was the Roman commendation of the later empire.
Roman commendation was initially based on a relationship of clientage be-
tween a freeman who received economic assistance and protection and a
wealthy patron who received personal service from the freeman in return.
For the free client and the patron, the satisfaction of the former and the
profit of the latter depended on their maximization of resources. Thus, for
the patron to receive the freeman's service, the patron had first to see to the
freeman's assistance and protection;' for the freeman to receive economic
assistance and protection, he was required to perform service for the patron.
The value of the one was thereby directed to the marginal benefit of the
other.
The interdependence of client and patron required a greater formality
than did that of the comites and princeps, though even here some aspects of
the relationship might remain implied.6 It has been found that, in the last
2. See generally J. BELLAMY, THE LAW OF TREASON IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER
MIDDLE AGES ch. I (1970) [hereinafter BELLAMY, TREASON IN ENGLAND]; also the materials
cited therein.
3. The terms were used by Tacitus in GERMANIA, and are thus Latin in origin, and
therefore date to at least the late first century A.D. See also the relationship as depicted in
such Anglo-Saxon epics as BEOWULF and SONG OF MALDON and the Continental SONG OF
ROLAND.
For the difficulties presented by the "[unlsettled and [un]stable scheme of technical
terms" in use in England following the Norman Conquest, with words having English, Danish,
Latin, or French origin, see F.W. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 8 (1897 & re-
print 1966) [hereinafter MAITLAND, DOMESDAY].
4. Compare the analysis of a more recent time in Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of
Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975).
5. As the patron accumulated increasing numbers of clients, so too would he acquire
by those numbers greater ability to perform their protection. The more clients commended
themselves to a patron, the greater that patron's power; the greater his power, the more protec-
tion he could give; and thus more clients, seeking to be protected, would commend themselves
to his care.
6. Compare, Anderson & Hill, supra note 4, at 163.
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years before the fall of Rome, it was generally out of desperation that free-
holders sought the protection of some powerful person. In light of the theo-
rem developed by R.H. Coase,7 that the parties will bribe one another as a
means of maximizing efficiency, it may be of some interest to note that
villagers often bribed the provincial dux to place troops in their village to
protect them from the imperial tax collector. Furthermore, if suit were
brought, it was claimed by the ducal court which invariably found for the
villagers.'
What began as an attempt by the client to obtain maximization of
security through protection of life and economic well-being ended up as a
contract through which that security and protection were obtained in ex-
change for a surrender to the patron of certain rights. In time, the relation-
ship between the parties would give way to status so that a hierarchy was
created in which the individual clients had placed themselves into vassalage,
or even villeinage or serfdom, while the patrons had become the nobility or
hereditary lords of European feudalism.
When the Anglo-Saxons invaded England they brought with them
their customs and practices, and thus the comitatus. When the Normans
arrived, some six centuries later, they found the practice of commendation,
whereby "smaller landowners had placed themselves in a relation of depen-
dence on superior lords," 10 deeply entrenched in Anglo-Saxon society.1 But
while the roots of the relationship upon which treason was to be based can
be traced to both the comitatus and commendation, it was brought to a
higher level of development under Carolingian vassalage which, in its most
essential form, was a contract or personal bond sworn to by the
participants.
Successors to the Merovingian line of kings of the Franks and named
after Charlemagne (768-814), the Carolingians perfected the contractual
aspects of vassalage by emphasizing its personal character. In return for a
7. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), reprinted in Eco-
NOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 17 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975).
8. 2 A.H.M. JONES, THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE 775-78 (1964). See also A. JONES,
THE DECLINE OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 291-92 (1966).
9. See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM ch. 5 (1863), reprinted in THE GREAT LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHERS 365, 375 (C. Morris ed. 1959).
For a proposed connection between "contractual thought" and "fundamental law," as well
as between "fundamental law" and its development (at least in meaning) into "constitutional
law," see Thompson, The History of Fundamental Law in Political Thought from the French
Wars of Religion to the American Revolution, 91 AM. HIST. REV. 1103 (1986).
10. F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 148-50 (H. Fisher
ed. 1965) [hereinafter MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY). See also W. STUBBS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 71 (J. Conford ed. 1979).
II. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY, supra note 3, at 68-75. See also W. STUBBS, supra note 10,
at 72.
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fief,12 a grant for the use of land (usufruct),'1 the recipient-vassal was re-
quired to render homage and to take an oath of fealty to the donor-lord.",
The coupling of homage with the oath not only made God a witness to the
exchange, it also required a promise of faithfulness by the recipient-vassal
to the donor-lord.1 5 The obligation of faithfulness was not, however, com-
pletely one-sided, for there were reciprocal obligations imposed on the lord
as well.1 When unfaithfulness occurred, the transgressor, whether lord or
vassal, was called a felon.1 7 While it remained technically possible for a
lord to act feloniously toward his vassal, in time it came to be limited to
"the disloyal refusal of a vassal to perform his owed service."1 " In such a
12. A precarium (pl. precaria) was originally "a grant of land to be held by some one
during the pleasure of the donor," but it might also be called beneficium. Because these were
"held on condition of military service" and because there was no word in Latin which distin-
guished that fact, the word "fief" was taken from German. C. STEPHENSON, MEDIEVAL FEU-
DALISM 7, 11-12 (1942); 1 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
61, 67, 68 n.I (the precarium was one of the germs of feudalism), 316 (1911) (hereinafter
POLLOCK & MAITLAND]; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, I11 (1911). See also Palmer, The Ori-
gins of Property in England, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. I, 6-7 n.26 (1985).
13. C. STEPHENSON, supra note 12, at 23; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 12, at
8, 114, 238. For contract between parties as involving a partial transfer of property rights, see
Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 49, 50 (1970).
14. 4 E. CHEYNEY, TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS FROM THE ORIGINAL SOURCES OF
EUROPEAN HISTORY, No. 3: DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF FEUDALISM 18-21 (1897) (The
Ceremony of Homage and Fealty). For the commitment of the lord to his vassal once homage
had been given, see Palmer, supra note 12, at 19. For homage and fealty, see I E. COKE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68a-b (London 1853) (commentary upon Littleton)
[hereinafter COKE, INSTITUTES].
15. Oaths of fealty were considered so important that they would later be required to
be enrolled in Parliament. See the Act of 21 Rich. 2, ch. 5 (1397).
16. E. CHEYNEY, supra note 14, at 5, 23-24. That "profound mutual obligations" were
incumbent in the feudal relationship (emphasis added) has been pointed out by Palmer, supra
note 12, at 4; see also Palmer, supra note 12, at 1-8. For the mutuality of faith, if not of
obligation, see the relationship between Roland and Charlemagne in SONG OF ROLAND.
Compare Newman, The Renaissance of Good Faith in Contracting in Anglo-American
Law, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 553 (1969).
17. Treason arose out of, and is thus a branch of, the more general category of crime
called felony. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES 15 (1797). "All treasons therefore, strictly speaking, are
felonies; though all felones are not treason." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 95 (1769 & reprint 1979) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES]. Because
of its obligations, the contractual aspects of the feudal relationship might be seen as a species
of tort. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14-16 (1974). Here might thus be found
an early instance of the search for extraordinary penalties to enforce what otherwise might be
seen as a contractual arrangement. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The Dynamics of
Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW
175 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979).
18. C. STEPHENSON, supra note 12, at 23, 33-34, 76 (stating that "if either [lord or
vassal] proved false, the other was justified in renouncing the original agreement." Further-
more, he states that "[s]o delicately balanced an obligation [as the feudal relationship was]
could have slight permanence unless it was of real advantage to both parties." The concept of
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1987], Art. 8
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case, the feudal incident of forfeiture would permit the lord to take back
the fief, if he could, through military force. 9
Thus, in the contractual setting created by the feudal relationship,
sanctions would be imposed on the party who reneged on or otherwise failed
to perform his feudal obligations. Should there have been no sanctions the
incentive to perform would have been nil, and the motivation to enter into
such relationships would have ceased to exist; why should a lord contract to
grant a fief if he received no benefit, or why should a vassal receive such a
grant if he were not obligated in return?20 The reciprocal obligations result-
ing from the interdependence of the feudal relationship were thus the result
of requirements of orderly medieval government (what, in a purely business
setting, might be termed "business needs") and the necessity to plan for the
future."
The Carolingians institutionalized feudal tenure throughout the em-
pire. Thus France, as one of its components, became a feudalized part of
the empire and, under the Normans, Normandy became a feudalized part
of France.2 In fact, by 1066 Normandy had become the epitome of a thor-
oughly feudalized state, and it was by way of Normandy that feudalism
and feudal tenure passed into England, and after Normandy that the Eng-
lish feudal state was patterned.2
mutuality of satisfaction thus becomes evident in the setting of this medieval form of
contract.).
19. The "strength of the feudal relationship" has been said to be capable of being de-
termined based on the lord's ability to take back his grant because of the vassal's disloyalty.
Palmer, supra note 12, at 6. For the distinction between escheat and forfeiture, see A. SIMP-
SON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 19-20 (1961), or any similarly
reputable work.
20. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, I J. LEGAL
STUD. 277 (1972), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 154 (A. Kronman & R.
Posner eds. 1979). See also R. PALMER, supra note 12, at 6.
21. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974); Mac-
neil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854 (1978). G. KEETON, THE ELEMENTARY
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 61 (2d ed. 1949) ("The basis of feudalism is a contract be-
tween a man and his lord. If the contract is arbitrarily broken, the relationship is at an end. If
the lord breaks it, the man is absolved from his obligation. The relationship is regulated by
law, which neither alone, but only both together, may change."). Keeton further states that
Magna Carta was "itself a contractual reaffirmation of contractual rights." It is thus under-
standable why "The barons and their advisors were [at the time of Magna Carta (1215)]
deeply concerned with the consequences of their feudal relationship with the king." Palmer,
The Economic and Cultural Impact of the Origins of Property: 1180-1220, 3 LAW & HIST.
REV. 375, 392 (1985).
Such reciprocal obligation and interdependence of relationship might be seen in terms of
social contract. See THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 564-65 (C. Morris ed. 1959) ("social
contract").
22. C. HASKINS, THE NORMANS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 67-69, 149-57 (1915).
23. C. STEPHENSON, supra note 12, at 84-86, who states at 85 that "[fQeudalism ...
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As a result of the Norman Conquest, a significant modification of feu-
dalism was introduced into England. By right of conquest, all land was
henceforth to be held by the king. As all land was held by someone, every-
one in effect became a vassal, directly or indirectly, of the king who could
require an oath of fealty from any landholder. 4 The result, in England, was
the binding by sworn contract of all holders of property to the king, the
breach of which would be treason against the Crown.6
was unknown in England before the Norman Conquest." It might be argued, and possibly with
great effect, that while feudal tenure was introduced into England after 1066, feudalism was
not. This argument would be based on the proposition that feudalism required decentralized
government. What England in fact got was a highly centralized state government. It might
thus be concluded that while England received the incidents of feudalism (to include feudal
tenure), England did not receive per se feudalism (but see Stephenson at 14 where he states
that feudalism "properly refer[s] to the peculiar association of vassalage with fief-holding.").
It must be noted, however, that centralized government or its opposite are not here the issue;
feudal tenure is, and there should be no doubt that it existed in England after 1066. The
various arguments dealing with the Norman Conquest, particularly the issue of English feudal-
ism, are presented in THE IMPACT OF THE NORMAN CONQUEST (C. Hollister ed. 1969).
Compare the concept of feudalism in England with that of property rights in the Ameri-
can West as presented by Anderson & Hill, supra note 4, at 163.
24. C. STEPHENSON, supra note 12, at 86-87. On the Continent the oath was given by
the vassal to the lord who granted the fief. Thus, while the king might grant a fief to A and
receive an oath of fealty in return, if A "subinfeudated" and made B his vassal, there was no
feudal - and thus no contractual - relationship formed between the king and B. This is not
what happened in England where B would be required to swear fealty to the king. Stephenson
explains "subinfeudation" at 28-29. I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 88, go even
further by stating that the oath was required of every free man in England. See also the
documents in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL His-
TORY § 11 (1937); as well as supra note 15.
25. Treason against the Crown was "high treason." Treasons that did not involve the
Crown were "petit" or "petty treason," which included, among others, the treason of a vassal
against his lord (when not the king), the treason of a servant against his master, and the
treason of a wife against her husband. Petit treason was given statutory definition by the Trea-
son Act of 1352, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2, § 5, and was abolished as such by 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31 (1828)
(second paragraph), when such acts became felony. Another form of treason was "misprision
of treason." This consisted of knowledge of and concealment of treason. Where such knowl-
edge and concealment involved high treason, the participants were generally charged as princi-
pals; high treason did not take such individuals into account as mere accessories because acces-
sories to high treason were considered principals. This was undoubtedly because of the
magnitude of the crime of high treason, an attack on the majesty of government. See infra
note 98.
Because land could be held of the Crown but not owned separately or distinctly from it
("fee-holder," "freeholder"), "the greatest possible interest in a thing [such as land] which a
mature system of law recognizes" would then have been possession rather than outright owner-
ship. A. HONORt, Ownership in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 108 (A. Guest ed.
1961) (italics deleted).
[Vol. 22
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II. CONTRACTUAL AMBIGUITY AND THE NEED FOR DEFINITE TERMS
If treason against the crown was the breach of a contract with the
king, what then constituted such a breach? Killing the king, seen as an
attack on the majesty of government, would surely fulfill the requirements
of a breach. On the other hand, distraining a traveler on a highway until a
ransom was paid would seem in no way to involve the majesty of govern-
ment or the contractual relation and surely would not be treason. In fact,
cases on both points demonstrate the ambiguity of treason because results
in both instances were opposite to what would otherwise be expected. 2
What was or was not to be included within the scope of treason was a
question that required a clear answer. Because the result may have ap-
proached a contract of adhesion, of singular importance was the source
from which the answer would come. If given by the king, as a means of
protecting his interest and ensuring his satisfaction, treason would be pre-
scribed in terms that were rather extensive; but if determined by those who
might later be called to account under it, thus for much the same purpose
as the king but with a different result caused by their interest and satisfac-
tion being at times inconsonant with the king's, the scope of treason would
be far more limited. In the end, somewhat by way of compromise, and thus
overcoming the problems inherent in an adhesion contract, it would not be
until nearly three hundred years after the Conquest that treason would for-
mally be defined - and then by act of Parliament, the famous Treason Act
of 1352.27
The Act of 1352 laid down seven heads or categories of treason. These
were:
1. to compass or imagine the death of the king, queen, or the
king's eldest son;
26. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 76, 78-79; 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 80 (1736); 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 6; BELLAMY, TREASON IN
ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 61-63.
On August 2, 1100, while hunting in the New Forest, William II was shot dead by an
arrow discharged by one of the knights in the hunting party. The circumstances hinted at
treason, though no such accusation was ever made, because Henry I was able to seize and hold
the throne against William's named heir, Duke Robert of Normandy. In 1347 a Hertfordshire
knight was charged with treason when he held "one of the king's subjects" for a ransom of
£90.
27. 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2, § 5 (1352); given in I STATUTES OF THE REALM 319 (Record
Commission ed. 1817 & reprint 1963) where previous misdating is noted, I STATUTES AT
LARGE 261 (0. Ruffhead ed. 1763) under the date 1350, 5 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENG-
LAND 452 (Sir Roland Burrows ed. 1948) under the date 1351. For the origin of this Act see
BELLAMY, TREASON IN ENGLAND, supra note 2, chs. 1-4; see also T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD,
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 276 n.i (C. Carmichael 3rd ed. 1886) [hereinafter TAS-
WELL-LANGMEAD, 3rd ed.].
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2. to violate the queen, the king's eldest unmarried daughter,
or the wife of the king's eldest son;
3. to levy war against the king in his realm;
4. to adhere to the king's enemies;
5. to counterfeit the Great Seal or the Privy Seal, or to coun-
terfeit royal money;
6. knowingly to bring false money (that is, counterfeit) into
the realm; and
7. to slay the chancellor, treasurer, or any of the judges while
performing their duties.
The efficiency of the 1352 Act can perhaps best be appreciated in
terms of the different perspectives of the sovereign and the governed. From
that of the Crown, a tightly drawn statute which restricted the scope of
treason to specifically enumerated categories would result in a loss of reve-
nue from forfeiture. However, such limitation of scope would overcome the
earlier abuses caused by vagueness and uncertainty and thus tend to the
common good by removing possible grievances and causes for a traitorous
rebellion against the king. Thus, while the Crown might lose some forfeit-
ures and the wealth the abuses might have brought, statutory definition of
treason would remove numerous sources of contention, caused by "trea-
son's" lack of precision, which might have resulted in armed rebellion
aimed at overthrowing the king. From the Crown's perspective, the balance
must favor the efficiency of the Act.
From the perspective of the populace, there would seem little doubt
that the Treason Act defined the offense with clarity sufficient for their
needs by setting forth with particularity the precise conduct that consti-
tuted treason. Thus, for commoners and nobles, as well for the king, the
Treason Act of 1352 was a striking example of clarification through statute
and therefore, for that reason at least, was a working paradigm of statutory
efficiency.2 8
That the Treason Act was efficient - remarkably so - is perhaps best
appreciated by the fact that the Act has stood for over six hundred years.
There have, however, been statutory modifications of treason from time to
time, often the result of changed circumstances of later times. Thus the
28. While efficient in the sense that the scope of treason had been refined and was
generally capable of being known by the general population, the Treason Act was not without
its shortcomings which produced some rather peculiar results. While apparently limited on its
face to the seven heads of treason enumerated above, the Act was in some cases extended
through interpretation to meet particular needs ("constructive treason"). Some of the more
flagrant examples are mentioned in MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 10, at
228.
[Vol. 22
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scope of treason was at times expanded, but at others it was curtailed. 9
From 1352 to 1485, a period of one hundred and thirty-three years, less
then ten treason statutes were enacted. Under the Tudors (1485-1603), a
period of one hundred and eighteen years, sixty-eight treason laws were
enacted. The latter, however, were largely a result of circumstances pecu-
liar to the dynasty:
1. the problems of succession occasioned by Henry VIII having
children by three different wives,
2. the break with Rome and the creation of an autonomous
Christian church, and
3. the problem of dealing with seminarians and Jesuits who at-
tempted to return England to Papal jurisdiction.
III. PENALTIES FOR TREASON: PUNISHMENT OF THE TRAITOR
A. Execution
Treason was considered a most heinous crime - "the highest civil
crime, which ... any man can possibly commit" 30 - the penalties for
which called for "ferocious procedures" which intended that such behavior
would never be undertaken "'unadvisedly, lightly, or wantonly'."'" This
was "because it concerneth the safety of his majestie, [and] the quiet of the
common-wealth."32 The physical punishment inflicted upon the traitor was
therefore "very solemn and terrible."33 It was to include each of the follow-
ing in execution of the sentence of death:
1. the convicted traitor was to be drawn to the place of
execution,"2. where he would be hanged but cut down while alive, 5
29. During the reign of Henry VIII, "the offence of high treason was vexatiously and
wantonly extended far beyond the limits marked out by the ancient statute of Edward III."
TASWELL-LANGMEAD, 3rd ed., supra note 27, at 383 (at 260 in T. Plucknett 10th ed. 1946).
The Act I Phil. & M., ch. 1, § I (1553), laid down that the scope of treason was to be
confined to that of 1352, but this Act was quickly superseded in the next reign.
30. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 75.
31. A popular account of the reign of Richard IIl: G. St. Aubyn, THE YEAR OF THREE
KINGS: 1483, at 233 (1983).
32. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 12, at the first page of the Proeme.
33. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 92; G. ELTON, POLICY AND PO-
LICE 294 (1972).
34. Drawing should not be overlooked as part of the punishment. It usually meant that
the prisoner was dragged behind a horse, and it often resulted in the death or incapacitation of
the prisoner. Before hurdles or other implements were authorized, so that the prisoner might
arrive alive and conscious, furnishing something the traitor could be drawn upon was itself
punishable by imprisonment. 3 J. REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 117-18 (1787).
35. Women convicted of treason were to be burned. In the case of a noble the king
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3. he would then be disembowelled, preferably while still alive,
and his entrails burned,
4. his head would be struck off,
5. his body would be quartered, and
6. the parts placed "at the king's disposal."
This last usually meant that the body parts would be put up, most often at
entrances to towns or along well-traveled roadways, as warnings to others of
what the price of treason entailed. 6
By way of example, for refusing the oath of supremacy, John Hough-
ton, Augustine Webster, Robert Lawrence, and Richard Reynolds were ex-
ecuted at Tyburn on Tuesday, 4 May 1535. After being hanged and cut
down while still alive, their hearts were cut out and then burned. They were
then beheaded and quartered, and their parts placed on long spears for pub-
lic display.87 The manner of execution for treason of Roger Bolingbroke in
the preceding century has been recorded thus:
He was drawn through the city to Tiburn gallows. There he was
hanged and taken down again, all alive. His bowels were cut out
of his body and burned before him. Then his head was cut off
and his body quartered. One quarter wassent to Oxford; a sec-
ond was sent to Cambridge; and the third to Bristol; and the.
fourth [is not given]. His head was set upon London Bridge, and
thus ended his life in this world.38
Such punishment was, of course, a product of the age in which it was
meted out: an age which saw the quality of the punishment as reflecting the
might permit decollation (beheading), but this was within the king's privilege and was afforded
because of the traitor's class or rank. Sir Thomas More, for example, although not a peer, had
been chancellor.
36. 1 M. HALE, supra note 26, at 382; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17,
at 92; See also 4 COKE, INSTITUTES t 210; 2 M. HALE, supra note 26, at 399; 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 93.
There is a popular misconception of the order in which execution was to be carried out
which states that traitors were hanged, drawn, and quartered (see, e.g., G. St. Aubyn, supra
note 31 at 56, 124). The correct formula would transpose "hanged" with "drawn." Popular
modern writers should, perhaps, not be severely censured for such error. The same mistaken
order is given in the early seventeenth century THE GUNPOWDER PLOT: THE NARRATIVE OF
OSWALD TEStMOND, ALIAS GREENWAY at 225 (F. Edwards trans. ed. 1973). The formula is
given properly and completely in G. ELTON, POLICY AND POLICE 294 (1972).
37. 8 LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, HENRY VIII Nos. 661, 666 (J.
Gairdner ed. 1885) [hereinafter, PAPERS OF HENRY VIIi]; H. FISHER, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VII TO THE DEATH OF HENRY VIII (1485-1547) 348-
49 (1906 & reprint 1969).
38. 2 THE BRUT 481 (F. Brie ed. 1908); B. WILKINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY (1399-1485) 59 (1964).
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quality of the crime.39 By accepting the standards of the time, one might
better comprehend Coke's assessment that "his body . . . shall be torn, pul-
led assunder, and destroyed, that intended to tear, and destroy the majesty
of government. °40
B. Forfeiture
Judgment of treason meant that all that the traitor possessed was to be
taken from him. Not only did he lose his life, but "all his manors, lands,
tenements, and hereditaments in fee-simple, or fee-tail of whomsoever they
be holden," were lost as well.," This loss was termed "forfeiture," and it
belonged to the king by prerogative right"2 and thus overrode the claim for
escheat that might otherwise be made by the lord of whom the lands were
directly held through subinfeudation. 43 This was because:
the offence [of treason] is committed against the soveraigne lord
the king, who is the light and the life of the common-wealth:
and therefore the law doth give to the king in satisfaction of his
offence, all the lands, &c. which the offender hath, and that no
subject should be partaker of any part of the forfeiture for this
offence.""
Furthermore, forfeiture as a consequence of treason was founded upon
the basic principle of a contractual relationship that had been breached.
Even prior to 1352, this contractual relationship had come to be looked
upon in terms of the fundamental precept that "allegiance . . . [was] due
from every man who lives under the King's protection," and this "whether
the oath [of allegiance] had been taken or not."' 35 The harm claimed was to
be found in the failure to perform, not necessarily in what the failure en-
tailed. 4" Thus once the breach had occurred, no matter how small or though
39. For forms of punishment in other countries, chiefly those of Germany, see CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE THROUGH THE AGES passim (J. Fosberry trans. 1981).
40. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at t 210.
41. Id.
42. I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 351-52; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIs-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 70 (1966 reprint).
43. A direct result of this conflict of interest between king and nobility was the enact-
ment of the statutory definition of treason that was the Treason Act of 25 Edw. 3, see supra
note 27. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 42, at 449-50; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
42 at 71. For forfeiture resulting from felony, see Magna Carta ch. 32. See supra note 19 for
escheat and forfeiture.
44. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 18.
45. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, 3rd ed., supra note 27, at 392 n.l.
46. Failure to perform military service in time of war or rebellion could be catastrophic
as it was for Richard Ill at the Battle of Bosworth (1485) when certain of his captains awaited
the outcome on the periphery of the battlefield. It would be of no significance to a charge of
treason if the feudal levy were merely on maneuvers, but it is to be doubted that failure at that
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it might be forgiven, treason had been committed and there was no going
back. Even when forgiven, forfeiture followed unless the king directed that
it would not. From the contractual standpoint, because the failure to per-
form had over time come to be placed solely on the part of the vassal hold-
ing the fief, it would seem a natural consequence that the fief would be
taken back to its grantor. When the fief was held through subinfeudation,
the lord who stood in between the king and the vassal was simply by-
passed.47
That forfeiture would take place as part of the punishment for treason
was never attacked as a prerogative right, though it was questioned in par-
ticular instances of application. This may seem peculiar when it is realized
that forfeiture did not feature as a formal part of the contract - that it
was not pointed to with particularity as a consequence which was to follow
a breach. It might thus be concluded that forfeiture was to be implied or
inferred from the contractual setting. It was the setting, the fact that the
king was a party to the contract, that allows the implication or inference to
be drawn. This was because forfeiture as a consequence of treason was ex-
plained by the consideration:
that he who has thus violated the fundamental principles of gov-
ernment, and broken his part of the original contract between
the king and people, hath abandoned his connexions with soci-
ety; and hath no longer any right to those advantages, which
before belonged to him purely as a member of the
community .... 48
Forfeiture was a form of repossession, and there was always the possi-
bility that valuable property might be sought where no treason had oc-
curred. For such to occur (that is, an abuse of power), it may well have
been as a result of an inequality within the framework of the contractual
relationship. In the present context, the question is whether the king might
abuse his power and seek the penalties for treason when no treason had
taken place, or when treason had not been proved, but the penalties were
desirable or advantageous, such as the forfeiture of valuable lands or the
execution of a possible rival to the throne.4 9
Following the flight of the earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnell from Ireland
to the Continent in 1607, the Privy Council, while directing that "a due
time would result in a charge of treason. If it did (no reference to such having been found) it
might result in a rare instance of a duty to mitigate on the part of the king; but "duty" may be
too strong a word.
47. The mesne lord might be looked to to watch over his personal vassals, but he was
neither guarantor nor surety for their behavior.
48. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 375.
49. LEFF, supra note 17, at 177-78.
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form [of law] must be pursued for proving the guilt of the fugitives [that]
their forfeitures [might be obtained]," stated without equivocation that
they liked "the room of the fugitives [that is, their lands] . . . better than
their company.""0 The result was that the earls' "room" became the means
through which the province in which they lived, the only part of Ireland
then still largely outside the control of the king's government, was brought
to subjugation through the Ulster Plantation. Voices in England were raised
in criticism of a statute which made it treason for Jesuits and other priests
to remain in England because it was "full of blood, danger, despair and
terrour or dread to the English Subjects of this Realm, our Brethren, Un-
cles and Kinsfolk" as well "also full of Confiscation.""1 Margaret Pole,
countess of Salisbury, was very likely executed in 1539 for no reason other
than that she was the mother of Reginald Cardinal Pole (a hated enemy of
Henry VIII) and that her family had a legitimate claim to the throne.5"
The development of use and of equitable trusts, as new interests in
land not previously conceived of within the structure of feudal tenure,
presented certain problems for forfeiture because the rights attached to the
legal estate only (the estate of the feofee to use or holder of legal title) and
not to that of the cestui que use (who had use and benefit of the lands but
not legal title). This was ultimately solved by the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen.
8, ch. 10 (1536), which transferred to the cestui que use the legal estate of
the feofee to use."3 Subsequently, the statutes 33 Hen. 8, ch. 20 (1541), and
50. 2 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, IRELAND, JAMES I 287 (C. Russell & J. Prender-
gast eds. 1874) (for the years 1606-1608).
51. 27 Eliz., ch. 2 (1585); S. D'EWES, THE JOURNALS OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DUR-
ING THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH 340 (1682).
52. 6 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC, ELIZABETH 407-09 (E. Green ed. 1870)
(for 1601-1603, with addenda for 1547-1565). A contemporary account reported that the
countess went to her death "not knowing her crime." 16 PAPERS OF HENRY VIII, supra note
37, at No. 897; 6 LETTERS, DESPATCHES, AND STATE PAPERS, ENGLAND AND SPAIN pt. 1, No.
166 (P. de Gayangos ed. 1890).
53. The text is in K. DIGBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY WITH ORIGINAL AUTHORITIES 347-54 (5th ed. 1897); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 42 at 71; 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 42, at 449-65; 1 COKE, INSTITUTES,
supra note 14, at 13a n.7 (Coke on Littleton). See also T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 575-87 (5th ed. 1956); G. ELTON, supra note 33, at 269-70. In addition
to the Statute, see also LORD DACRE'S CASE, Y.B. 27 Hen. 8 fo. 7, pl. 22 (1535), and I THE
REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, reprinted in 93 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOC'Y
228 (J. Baker ed. 1977).
"Use" described a situation in which "the owner of the fee simple title to real property
granted the fee to - enfeoffed - others, who were to do with the property what the grantor
- feoffer - specified." Such was thus not illegal, but rather beyond the scope of the law,
because it by-passed and did not violate the rules as they then existed. DeVine, Ecclesiastical
Antecedents to Secular Jurisdiction Over the Feoffment to the Uses to be Declared in Testa-
mentary Instructions, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295, 295 & n.1, 317-19 (1986).
For the early development of "use" (or "feoffment to uses"), see J. BAKER, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 210-219 (2d ed. 1979).
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5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 11 (1552), mandated forfeiture of those lands held to the
use of a traitor. These Acts were quickly extended to apply to equitable
trusts as well." The problem of obtaining forfeiture for the Crown where
either use or equitable trusts were utilized was thus solved, and henceforth
neither could be used to escape the penalty of forfeiture.
Forfeiture for treason (as well as escheat for felony) was not abolished
until 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 23, § 1 (1870), yet it continued as a consequence of
outlawry following indictment for treason. This was because outlawry was
essentially a means of inflicting punishment on a fugitive; his flight was
accepted as an admission of guilt. Thus outlawry was roughly the
equivalent of conviction, though accomplished with the accused not pre-
sent-and thus without benefit of trial, following which execution of justice
would follow. 5
Not only were all real properties forfeited to the Crown, but all chat-
tels or personal possessions were forfeited as well.56 However, there is a
difference between forfeiture of real and of chattel property, and it is a
considerable one because it points to the moment when forfeiture might be
accomplished. Forfeiture of lands took place upon attainder, the moment at
which sentence of death was pronounced at trial or declaration of outlawry
was made. Forfeiture of personalties occurred upon conviction. Thus the
traitor convicted but not sentenced because the king let it be known that
sentence was not to be passed or that he had pardoned the traitor would
forfeit his chattels but not his real property.57 Furthermore, the forfeiture
54. 1 M. HALE, supra note 26, at 240-44, 248-49; 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14,
at 18-19.
"Trust" originally had the same meaning as "use", but over time came to be used to
designate the equitable estates which the Statute of Uses did not execute. See Barton, The
Statute of Uses and the Trust of Freeholds, 82 LAW Q. REV. 215 (1966). That the expansion
of Chancery's jurisdiction was the result of uses has been proposed by Avery, The History of
the Equitable Jurisdiction of the Chancery before 1460, 42 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 129
(1969).
55. Richards, is Outlawry Obsolete?, 18 LAW Q. REV. 297, 298-300 (1902); 2 M.
HALE, supra note 26, at 205, 209; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 314-15.
In England death in rebellion did not result in further punishment unless the process of
outlawry had previously been accomplished. 34 Edw. 3, ch. 12 (1360) (which established that
there would be no forfeiture following death in rebellion unless there had first been an attain-
der); 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 12. Such was not the case in Ireland where death
in rebellion was an attainder in law resulting in forfeiture. See infra through note 83 and
accompanying text.
56. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 374.
For the disposition of Sir Walter Raleigh's forfeited goods by a grant dated February 14,
1604 and those of the earl of Somerset by a grant dated June 24, 1619 see T. RYMER,
FOEDERA tome 7, pt. 2, at 108, pt. 3, at 110 (G. Holmes 3rd ed. 1742).
57. For the pardons for treason granted to the countess of Oxford on December 5,
1404, the duke of Norfolk on August 29, 1553, and the marquess of Northampton on January
3, 1554 see T. RYMER, supra note 56, at tome 4, pt. 1, at 74, tome 6, pt. 4, at 4, 13. Robert
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of real property related back to the treason committed, so that all later
sales or encumbrances were void. The forfeiture of personalties did not re-
late back, and thus only that which was held at the time of conviction was
forfeited." The distinction may seem slight, but it could prove significant
because it would permit bona fide sale of possessions and allow "for the
sustenance of himself [that is, the one charged with treason] and family
between the fact [of the treason committed] and conviction. '59 Of course,
the sale must be bona fide and not done through collusion intended to de-
fraud the Crown. In the latter instance the possessions would remain sub-
ject to forfeiture, "for they are all the while truly and substantially the
goods of the offender: and as he, if acquitted, might recover them himself,
as not parted with for good consideration; so, in case he happens to be con-
victed, the law will recover them for the king."6
IV. PENALTIES FOR TREASON: PUNISHMENT OF THE SPOUSE
Except for a brief time in the reign of Edward VI and under specific
offenses legislated as treason under Elizabeth, the wife of a traitor lost her
claim to dower - "His wife, that is a part of himself, (et erunt animae
duae in carne una) shall lose her dower."'" This was because a wife had no
right in dower until her husband's death, and thus the right must follow the
treason which would overcome a claim for dower. However, a wife would
not lose her jointure when the treason occurred after marriage because for-
feiture related back to the moment of the treason and her jointure had been
settled upon her at an earlier date. 2 This would mean that treason commit-
ted before marriage would defeat a wife's jointure if conferred, say, by way
Rudstowe, Leonard Digges, Johan Goldewell, and Thomas Fane, attainted of high treason for
rebellion, were granted a stay of execution on March 18, 1554 for the interesting reason of
"Pitie and Compassion." T. RYMER, supra note 56, at tome 67, pt. 4, at 19.
Because they were often obtained through payment of fines and because they could be
used as tools of state to secure peace, pardons which resulted in loss of forfeiture to the Crown
were not necessarily an economic deprivation.
For pardons under the Tudors, see J. BELLAMY, THE TUDOR LAW OF TREASON, AN IN-
TRODUCTION (1979) (particularly 218-25) [hereinafter, BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW].
58. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 212; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra
note 17, at 373, 380.
59. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 380; 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 454 (1721); 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 211.
60. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 381.
61. I COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 37a, 41a to include note 4 (Coke on Lit-
tleton). I Edw. 6, ch. 12 (1547), permitted the wife to retain her dower, but 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch.
11 (1551-52), took it away. 5 Eliz., ch. 1 (1563), dealt with refusing the oath of supremacy a
second time; 5 Eliz., ch. 11 (1563), and 18 Eliz., ch. 1 (1576), both dealt with offenses regard-
ing coinage.
For a brief introduction to dower see T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 53, at 566-68.
62. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 375.
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of a wedding gift. The husband of a female traitor was not covered by stat-
ute and so was able to retain curtesy of his wife's lands."
While in no way taking into account the contract concept of duty to
mitigate,6" the Crown was not without sympathy where wives of traitors
were concerned and would, on occasion, allow them some form of compen-
sation.6 5 This usually meant that the wife would be granted something out
of the husband's chattels.16 More noteworthy, because of its rarity, was the
retention by a wife of lands she possessed in her own right, separate from
dower and distinct from jointure, or lands jointly held with a convicted hus-
band. Such a concession would seem to have required specific mention by
Act of Parliament. 67
If the Crown were to proceed to forfeiture by expending the time and
efforts of its officials, coupled with the costs of maintaining the prisoner
(the expense, however, was often his own) and of the trial, it would hardly
have been economically rational for a standard policy to dictate that it
would all be wasted and thrown away by a practice that would always
make provision for the wife. Such practice would in fact militate against
policy, but the king's interest in a particular case might overcome policy
simply because he desired it to be overcome. Then too, the king might be
persuaded to a wife's cause through the intervention of an important minis-
ter of state." When the wife of a traitor was provided for, whether for
63. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 375; i M. HALE, supra note 26,
at 359.
64. There was no duty to mitigate punishment for treason. As a modern concept, it
would not have been thought of, much less would it have been used in treason.
65. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 216.
66. IvES, Court and County Palatine in the Reign of Henry VIII: The Career of Wil-
liam Brereton of Malpas, HISTORIC SOCIETY OF LANCASHIRE AND CHESHIRE 34 (1972) (for
such a grant to Brereton's wife); see also THE LETTERS AND ACCOUNTS OF WILLIAM BRER-
ETON OF MALPAS (E. Ives ed. 1976). Grants were occasionally made for the care of a traitor's
wife, a number of which are noted in Lander, Attainder and Forfeiture, 1453-1509, 4 HIST. J.
141 (1961) (to include note 95). See also D. LOADES, Two TUDOR CONSPIRACIES 122 (1965);
Ross, Forfeiture for Treason in the Reign of Richard I1, 71 ENG. HIST. REV. 560, 574 n.5
(1956) (maintenance allowances for the wives of the earl of Warwick and Sir Thomas
Mortimer).
67. Examples are to be found in 7 Hen. 7, ch. 23 (1491), which excepted certain lands
of the wives of Sir Robert Chamberlain and Richard White; 14 & 15 Hen. 8, ch. 22 (1523-
1524), did much the same for the duchess of Buckingham (Eleanor Stafford); and 23 Hen. 8,
ch. 34 (1532), which excepted the wife of Rhys ap Griffiths. Livery of dower was permitted to
Philippa Mortimer and livery of a moiety of the Bohun estates was promised to Eleanor de
Bohun. Ross, supra note 66 at 574 n.5.
68. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 217. Bellamy credits Thomas Cromwell,
seemingly out of character, as proposing mercy through assistance to both wives and children
of convicted traitors. The popular notion of Cromwell as the dutiful servant of Henry VIII
may be in need of modification, if not revision. Note that this is mercy and not a duty to
mitigate.
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reasons of state or through the intercession of some highly placed person or
for purely personal reasons of the king, it was merely an instance of royal
mercy, and not an application of a duty to mitigate.
V. PENALTIES FOR TREASON: PUNISHMENT OF THE CHILDREN AND
POSTERITY
Terrible though it may have been, that a traitor would face loss of both
life and possessions was a punishment hardly outstanding in terms of sever-
ity. That the wife of a traitor would also be called to account for her
spouse's activities was well within the framework of the law as it then
stood. But while it may have been less physically shocking, it was certainly
a most drastic expedient to punish one whose only connection to the treason
was that she was wedded to the traitor. However, from an economic per-
spective, the most devastating punishment was that visited upon the off-
spring and posterity of the traitor, for they would be required to expiate the
crime of their progenitor long after it had faded from living memory and
into the pages of history.
The punishment extended to those descended from a traitor was that
the traitor, as a result of his treason, "shall lose his children (for they be-
come base and ignoble)" and he shall also "lose his posterity, for his blood
is stained and corrupted, and they cannot inherit."69 Specifically, as Coke
explained it, "If a man be attainted of treason .... although he-be borne
within wedlocke, he can be heire to no man, nor any man heire to him, ...
for that by his attainder his blood is corrupted. °7 0 Corruption of blood was
demonstrated during the execution by castration of the traitor as part of the
disembowelling.71 The disinheriting of future generations was to extend
forever.72
Corruption of blood, present punishment extended into the future, was
intended as a recourse to rationality and thus a deterrent that would over-
come what otherwise might prove a precipitate course of action. This was
69. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 210; 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra
note 17, at 251.
70. I COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 8a (Coke on Littleton).
71. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 204; G. ELTON, supra note 33, at 294.
72. RANULPH DE GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI
ANGLIAE QUI GLANVILLA VOCATUR 173 (G. Hall ed. 1965). Blackstone speaks "of future
incapacities even to the twentieth generation." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17,
at 381. Whether forever or merely twenty generations, the meaning, if not the result, is much
the same. In 1977 the descendants of the Gunpowder Plot conspirators of 1605 were recom-
mended to be permitted to inherit, as were others caught up in fifty-one other acts of attainder
passed between 1491 and 1783. THE LAW COMMISSION AND THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION,
STATUTE LAW REVISION, EIGHTH REPORT (1977); Parkin, Guy Law Reduced to Ashes, The
Guardian, Jan. 28, 1977, at 4.
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because, for English society of the feudal and early modern epoch, wealth,
power, and station were predicated upon the accumulation and possession of
property, and that property was to be passed on to one's offspring, so far as
the law would permit, as the means of perpetuating the wealth, power, and
station of the family. Specifically, therefore, corruption of blood would force
a potential traitor to restraint and moderation by making him aware that,
in addition to himself and his wife, the rigor of the law would be brought to
bear against his offspring and succeeding generations. The innate or natural
desire to secure for one's children and posterity what would otherwise be
expected to be their patrimony or birthright through inheritance was thus
intended to counteract or curb a rashness that might take little account of
one's own safety or even the well-being of a spouse. Thus, if treason were
contemplated, the individual, in considering the totality of the conse-
quences, might be recalled to reason and rationality, "not only by the sense
of his duty [to the Crown], and dread of personal punishment, but also by
his passions and natural affections; and will interest every dependent and
relation he has, to keep him from offending.""3
While he was examining neither the general historical setting currently
under review nor the specific issues presented by the law of treason, the
purpose, if not the effect, of corruption of blood as a potential punishment
might be seen to greater advantage in terms of law and economics by refer-
ence to what Richard Posner has written regarding the law of contract.74
One engages in contract (the feudal relationship between the king as sover-
eign lord and the subjects as vassals) 75 to maximize value - the continua-
tion of peace and tranquility throughout the realm. But the further into the
future the contract is extended, as it automatically would be by the natural
succession of kings and heirs by right of inheritance, the more difficult it
becomes to maximize values at the time the contract is formed. Therefore,
present liability is imposed into the future as a means of achieving contin-
ued maximization of wealth or value - thus the penalties for treason were
to be extended into the future to ensure the maximization of peace and
tranquility.
The extension of liability into future generations was explained by the
fact that treason was a violation of "the fundamental principles of govern-
ment" which resulted in the traitor's breach "of the original contract" con-
73. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 375. However, this does not take
into account the first head of the Treason Act of 1352, for even to have imagined treason was
to have committed it. No overt act was required under this head for treason to have been done;
the thought alone constituted treason.
74. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economic Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977), re-
printed in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 47 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979).
75. That the feudal relationship instituted by William I following the Conquest in-
cluded "a set of determinate contracts" between himself and his tenants-in-chief has been
pointed out by I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 92.
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cluded between sovereign and subjects as a means of obtaining orderly gov-
ernment for and peace within the realm.7 The traitor, by his treason, had
severed himself from society and thereby could no longer partake of those
requisites and advantages that were, by right of membership, to belong to
each individual person who comprised the community. By placing himself
outside the commonality or general body, all social advantages were lost
and there could be no question of a traitor's passing on to his progeny that




When no trial at common law had taken or could take place (for ex-
ample, when death in rebellion had occurred) or when forfeiture was de-
sired but the common law proved deficient for that purpose (for example,
"the forfeiture of equitable and entailed estates . . . often escaped at com-
mon law" 76), recourse might be had to attainder by Act of Parliament. In
cases where the treason involved violation of the new treason statutes of the
sixteenth century,79 it is to be noted that Parliament was at times inclined
"to give way to [an] equitable. . . provision" whereby "corruption of blood
shall be saved."'80 One Act that defined the scope of treason with regard to
the alienation of obedience from the sovereign to the pope, thus not itself an
Act of Attainder, contained a provision which specifically excluded both
corruption of blood and the disinheriting of any heir, as well as loss of
dower, from punishment for conviction."
The principal purpose of the Act of Attainder, however, was not to
alleviate punishment, but rather a means to secure it. Such Acts proved
helpful in affirming common law indictments, as well as for affirming out-
lawry, and in providing a means for disposing of the lands and property of
76. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 375; see also POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 92.
77. For the origin and early history of attainder see T. PLUCKNETT, Impeachment and
Attainder, 3 TRANS. ROYAL HIST. SOCIETY 145 (5th series 1953). See also BELLAMY, TREA-
SON IN ENGLAND, supra note 2, at ch. 7; Lander, Attainder and Forfeiture 1453-1509, 4 HIsT.
J. 119, reprinted in 2 HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 92 (E. Fryde & E.
Miller eds. 1970); Lehmberg, Parliamentary Attainder in the Reign of Henry VIII, 18 HIST.
J. 675 (1975); G. ELTON, supra note 33, at 270 n.1, 275 n.3 (1972).
78. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 262 n.s. (T.
Plucknett 10th ed. 1946) [hereinafter TASWELL-LANGMEAD, 10th ed.].
79. For example, the offense of acknowledging papal supremacy and certain coinage
offenses. Particular Acts included 5 Eliz., chs. I, I1 (1563); 18 Eliz., ch. 1 (1576). Among
later Acts were 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 26 (1696-97), and 15 & 16 Geo. 2, ch. 28 (1742).
80. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 382.
81. 13 Eliz., ch. 2 (1571).
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dead traitors by giving to the Crown "sound title. '82 Acts of Attainder
could thus be used to overcome the limitations of 34 Edw. 3, ch. 12 (1360),
which specified that there would be no forfeiture without attaint of anyone
killed in rebellion. Odd as it might seem, this limitation on forfeiture did
not exist as part of transplanted English law in Ireland where the matter
was more expeditiously capable of resolution because death in rebellion was
itself an attainder in law in Ireland. All that was required there was a com-
mission to enquire super visum corporis of the dead rebel, a declaration by
the commission that rebellion had occurred, a finding by it that death took
place while in rebellion, and a determination that it was indeed the rebel
whose body had been found. There was therefore no need in Ireland to
make use of either protracted legal procedures or to await the sitting of
Parliament to obtain the forfeiture of a dead rebel. 83
The efficiency of Parliamentary attainder was noted in the reign of
Henry VIII when Cromwell brought it to its highest level of perfection by
using such Acts against individuals who could have been lawfully tried at
common law.84 Trial at law would have been foreborne where the evidence
seemed insufficient for conviction, or where an unwanted public disclosure
would be made through presentation of witnesses or other evidence, or
where the existing law did not cover the offense.85 Statutory attainder could
easily overcome such problems. For instance, while defense might on occa-
sion be permitted, it had "always been clear that a bill of attainder may be
lawfully passed without any opportunity for defence being given."8 Thus,
because it was a legislative act rather than a trial, attainder could obviate
an accused's exculpatory reply to the charges and any disclosure that might
prove harmful or unpleasant to the Crown.8 When Cromwell, acting at the
king's command, enquired of the judges whether an Act of Attainder that
condemned an accused traitor to death without benefit of hearing him in
defense could ever be overturned at law, they replied that it could not.
The answer given by the judges, that Parliament could indeed con-
demn to death a man available for trial at common law and do so without
hearing his defense and without fear that the Act might later be defeated in
court, is instructive both as to the state of the law and the level of timidity
of its judges. While acknowledging that the use of attainder in such an
instance "would form a dangerous precedent" because it would allow an
82. BELLAMY, TREASON IN ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 137, 184, 195, 203.
83. F. Harris, The Rebellion of Sir Cahir O'Doherty and its Legal Aftermath, 15 THE
IRISH JURIST 298, 306 (1980).
84. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 53, at 205 n.3; 4 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at
37; J. TANNER, TUDOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS, 1485-1603, 423 (1922).
85. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 211.
86. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 53, at 205; 4 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 37.
87. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, 3rd ed., supra note 27, at 384-85; TASWELL-LANGMEAD,
10th ed., supra note 78, at 262.
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accused, who could otherwise speak for himself, to be condemned without
being heard in his defense and "that Parliament should rather set an exam-
ple to inferior courts by proceeding according to justice," Parliamentary
attainder "could never, under any circumstances, be subsequently ques-
tioned in a court of law" because the court of Parliament was supreme.88
A striking example of Cromwell's approach to and use of attainder can
be found in the case of Elizabeth Barton, known as "the Holy Maid" or
"the Nun of Kent," who, with a number of accomplices, was charged
before Parliament in 1534 after an attempt to do so through judicial means
had failed. Parliament accepted no evidence and heard no defense; only a
confession of questionable quality and the results of a Privy Council enquiry
were admitted. Barton and her fellows were executed at Tyburn on the 20th
of April.89
So long as king and Parliament were not in opposition, or so long as
the latter was subservient to the interests of the former, then attainder by
statute was an efficient method of moving against actual and suspected trai-
tors, whether dead or alive, as well as for securing their forfeitures. This
was particularly so when the affairs of the king were managed by one such
as Cromwell. The efficiency of Parliamentary attainder cannot, therefore,
be minimized. There were, after all, no court costs, and Parliament would
have been sitting for other purposes. The economics of working through
Parliament would have been extremely worthwhile, particularly as an ac-
cused's defense need not be heard, witnesses and evidence need not be pro-
duced, and Crown secrets could be maintained and embarrassment
foreclosed.
VII. PENALTIES FOR TREASON: DETERRENCE
It has been said that "the rule of law, whatever the intention of its
originator, does tend to produce an attitude of obedience in the subject." °
What is not addressed therein is the cause or motivation which tends to
bring about the attitude to obey. Two possible explanations seem immedi-
ately apparent. On the one hand, obedience may result from nothing more
88. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, 3rd ed., supra note 27, at 385; TASWELL-LANGMEAD, 10th
ed., supra note 78, at 262; 4 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 37; J. TANNER, supra note
84, at 423. An Act of Attainder was, after all, a legislative function which obligated the judges
to obedience.
89. 25 Hen. 8, ch. 12 (1534); 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 446; 1 R. MERRIMAN, LIFE
AND LETTERS OF THOMAS CROMWELL 119 (1902); H. FISHER, supra note 37, at 334; BEL-
LAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 23, 28; G. ELTON, supra note 33, at 274-75.
At one time a small tributary of the River Thames, Tyburn was the site of a permanent
gallows from the Middle Ages until 1783. The gallows was near the modern tourist attraction
of Speaker's Corner at Marble Arch in Hyde Park.
90. Williams, Language and the Law - V, 62 LAW Q. REv. 387, 398 (1946).
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than that the law is there, and by its existence it is to be obeyed. Such
obedience might be the consequence of habit. In the context of the law of
treason, obedience would thus be the product of ancient loyalties, buttressed
perhaps by the chivalric code of honor, which loyalties would not be broken
without extreme cause. Alternatively, fear of punishment for transgression
could well dictate obedience even when the motivation to do otherwise may
have been extreme. "
What brought a traitor to his treason may be determined from the
facts of history, at least insofar as extant records will permit. Chief among
the causes would seem to have been tyranny: abuse of ancient custom, un-
warranted taxation, and, after the Reformation, the assertion of heresy in
the sovereign. When a treason was abandoned, the reasons for its being
given up are more difficult, if not impossible, to discern. This is because
where treason was abandoned, it is highly unlikely that evidence of the de-
sign would be left to posterity; it would have been too easy for it to have
fallen into the wrong hands during the lifetime of one who had plotted
treason.
So ingrained that it could not be overcome no matter what the justifi-
cation, loyalty to the ancient line of kings may have forestalled treason
against a tyrant by members of a class bound by honor, duty, and past
association. Those less bound by the strictures of such a code of behavior
may have had more pragmatic reasons for putting aside plans for treason.
Discovery of a plot would mean capture, torture,9" conviction, and execution
of sentence with all that the terrible punishment of treason entailed. The
effectiveness of fear of such punishment as the cause for obedience can only
91. Coke believed punishment was intended to deter. I COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note
14, at 41a (Coke on Littleton). It is to be noted that other reasons for obedience may exist,
and that they may be more instrumental.
92. There should be no doubt that Coke, Blackstone, and others notwithstanding, tor-
ture of prisoners in legal custody was used. 2 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 48; 3 COKE,
INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 34-35; 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 129; 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 320-21. Blackstone attempted to distinguish
the use of the rack by stating that "it was occasionally used as an engine of state, not of law"
during Elizabeth's reign. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 321. Such ration-
alization would hardly have mattered to an accused; its use by the "state" was in its police
capacity, and thus adjunct to the "law." Such a distinction as Blackstone's would seem to have
been too finely drawn, pointing out what in fact did not make a difference. Numerous in-
stances of the use of torture can be found among the State Papers, both English and Irish, and
other records. As one example, Francis Throckmorton was racked at the Tower of London on
at least two occasions in 1583. Throckmorton, A discouerie of the treasons practiced and
attempted against the Queenes Maiestie and the Realme, (I 584), reprinted in ELIZABETHAN
BACKGROUNDS 144, 148 (A. Kinney ed. 1975).
See Magna Carta ch. 39; 5 Edw. 3, ch. 9 (1331). See also J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND
THE LAW OF PROOF, ENGLAND AND EUROPE IN THE ANCIENT R-GIME (1977); J. HEALTH,
TORTURE AND ENGLISH LAW, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL HISTORY FROM THE
PLANTAGENETS TO THE STUARTS (1982).
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be surmised. Perhaps only on the scaffold, with execution imminent, might
its effect on the traitor be seen. Yet, a recent study of treason in the six-
teenth century has discovered "virtually no reference to any displaying
fear" on the way to or at the place of execution."3
The following might suffice as examples of behavior just prior to execu-
tion. In 1554 the duke of Suffolk thought more of the unwanted presence of
a chaplain on the scaffold than he did of his impending execution, and went
so far as to fight to remove him. Robert Southwell debated the decrees of
the Council of Trent as he stood on the scaffold late in Elizabeth's reign.
William Freeman debated points of religion with the chaplain present at his
execution in 1595; each asked and received the other's forgiveness before
Freeman died. In 1585 John Hewett would seem to have become engaged
in a disputation on matters of faith right up to the moment of his execution.
Mary Queen of Scots, Anthony Babington, and Southwell asked that their
friends pray for them, and these were almost the last words of each. 94
Many steadfastly denied their guilt, even to the moment of execution. Some
admitted a degree of guilt, but it was rare to find a scaffold admission
which specified treason. Those who admitted guilt generally spoke of their
having committed an offense against law or king, thereby indicating that
while the condemned had no complaint about his trial, he felt that the
charge of treason was more than his action warranted.95
Thomas Wintour, one of the principal organizers of the Gunpowder
Plot (1605), took time to exculpate a number of Jesuits believed to have
been accomplices to the plot. His brother, Robert Wintour, "remained
rather withdrawn into himself, and obviously praying" right up to the mo-
ment when he died. John Grant, when asked if he was sorry for what he
had done, answered that "it was not the time or place to discuss cases of
conscience;" rather, his purpose at that time and place was "to die, not to
dispute matter of that kind." Ambrose Rookwood "begged the king to show
favour to his wife and sons."" Anthony Babington had done much the same
93. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 209 (pointing to John Felton as the "one
exception concerning the displaying of trepidation" at 282 n.107); see I W. COBBETT & T.
HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1087 (1809).
94. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 192-93, 278 n.42.
It is realized that these are examples of individuals who died largely as a result of the
religious treason laws; this species of treason may have imbued the traitors with a conviction
that fully justified in their own mind the treason committed. Further research may turn up
different results where the treason was political, or at least not religious.
95. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 195-98. Among those who denied guilt
were the countess of Salisbury (1539), Appleyard (1551), four of the men of the duke of
Somerset (1552), Edmund Campion (1581), Thomas Ford (1582), William Parry (1584), Ed-
ward Abington (1588), Brian O'Rourke (1591), William Freeman (1595), as well as most of
the priests and Jesuits executed under the religious treason laws of Elizabeth.
96. H. WILLIAMSON, THE GUNPOWDER PLOT 227-29 (1952).
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in 1586, though from what he said it cannot be determined whether his
request was directed to the queen, his friends, or others.9"
From examination of words and demeanor on the scaffold, it would
appear that the fate of traitors may have weighed heavily on the minds of
those who contemplated treason but that they were willing to make the
sacrifice in the hope that the treason would prove successful or remain un-
detected. How many treasons never got off the ground because the conse-
quences of failure were too great cannot be known. Those who continued
with their designs, though they fully realized that a grizzly execution for
them and economic ruin for their family awaited failure or discovery, would
for the most part appear not to have thrown caution to the wind to risk all
in a desperate gamble. Rather, having considered the penalties and the like-
lihood of success, or of failure, they were determined in their course of ac-
tion in spite of, and not deterred because of, the consequences. Because the
odds were heavily against such a venture, the apparatus of the State being
in position both to learn of a treason when it remained premature for suc-
cess and to suppress it by force when necessary, such may have been politi-
cally irrational at the least and certainly economically irrational.
Monitoring costs by the government were generally negligible. To
know of a treason and not report it was also a form of treason, 98 so one who
learned of a plot was likely to turn government informer as a means of
saving himself. Under Cromwell, information concerning treason was often
received without any attempt having been made to obtain it, and the source
of this information often proved to be ordinary folk rather than government
spies or professional informers.99 Spies and other professional agents were
used, as was the promise of reward to induce information, but these profes-
sionals were generally paid only for information received, and the costs in-
curred in such operations might be recouped through forfeiture. 10
97. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 199.
98. Knowledge of treason was to be brought immediately to the king's attention; it was,
after all, a citizen's duty. To know of a treason and not report it was misprision of treason, but
one who knew of a plot against the Crown might be charged as an accomplice, and accom-
plices to high treason were principals. 2 H. BRACTON, HENRICI DE BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET
CONSUETUDINiBUS ANGLIAE 335 (G. Woodbine ed. 1915-42); BELLAMY, TREASON IN ENG-
LAND, supra note 2, at 8, 17, 240; BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 83; G. ELTON,
supra note 33, at 345-50.
99. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 83; G. ELTON, supra note 33, at 339,
345, 382.
100. I TUDOR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS, No. 358 (P. Hughes & J. Larkin eds. 1964); 2
TUDOR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS Nos. 577, 672 (P. Hughes & J. Larkin eds. 1969); BELLAMY,
TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at 83-85. An example of Cromwell's use of spies is to be found in
I R. MERRIMAN, supra note 89, at 360, but Elton argues convincingly that there was no
organized spy system under Cromwell. G. ELTON, supra note 33, at 327-29, 331-33. Drafted
in 1531, but not included in the Treason Act of 1534, 26 Hen. 8, ch. 13, was a proposal to give
as reward a pardon and part of the lands and chattels forfeited by a convicted traitor to any-
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The most cost-effective source of information regarding treason, as well
as other criminal or non-criminal matters and much more besides, undoubt-
edly was the local justices of the peace. 0 ' Because they were of the gentry,
the same social class that supplied members to Parliament, justices of the
peace were generally "conservative and careful." Because they were ap-
pointed by the Crown, local justices looked out for and guarded the royal
interest and were thus "a very suitable medium for the enforcement of the
policy of the central government on the countryside." Furthermore, because
their ultimate responsibility was to the king through the Privy Council, jus-
tices of the peace could be expected to report any instances of treason, real
or suspected, immediately to the king's ministers. 02
While their power to try indictable offenses did not extend to cases of
treason unless empowered to do so under a separate commission of oyer and
terminer (but important treason cases would be excepted from their care),
justices of the peace were in a position to obtain information concerning
suspected treason, and it was their duty to pass this information on to the
Privy Council. While they might not bring to trial a particular treason case,
justices of the peace could make enquiry and receive indictments, and the
Privy Council might direct that further investigation be done. Justices of
the peace could therefore search for suspected traitors, obtain physical evi-
dence, and make enquiry of informers and witnesses so that the information
passed on was based on something more than rumor or speculation.10 3
In light of the fact that the justices of the peace were the king's eyes
and ears in the countryside, and thus of singular importance in troubled
times, it would seem that they would be particularly well paid for their
one involved in a treason plot who turned in the fellow conspirators. BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW,
supra note 57, at 84; G. ELTON, supra note 33, at 267-69, 271-72. Elton states at 345 that it
was expected that information concerning treason would come from individuals close to the
offender; the government, in fact, "made no attempt to stimulate informing either by offering
rewards or by organizing a spy system."
While there may have been a few salaried professional spies and agents, likely more so
under the Tudors, it would seem that most were paid for particular services rendered. It would
be interesting, for instance, to know whether Richard Topcliffe, the priest catcher, was paid
per head or if he was in fact a salaried employee of Elizabeth's government.
101. See the entries listed under Local Government: Justices of the Peace in BIBLIOGRA-
PHY OF BRITISH HISTORY: TUDOR PERIOD, 1485-1603, 109 (C. Read 2d ed. 1959) and BIBLI-
OGRAPHY OF BRITISH HISTORY: STUART PERIOD, 1603-1714, 135 (M. Keeler 2d ed. 1970).
102. G. SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 298, 299 (1955);
MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 10, at 207; LORD CROSS OF CHELSEA & G.
HAND, RADCLIFFE AND CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 109 (5th ed. 1971).
103. 7 PAPERS OF HENRY VIii, supra note 37, at Nos. 779, 902; 13 PAPERS OF HENRY
VIII, part 1, No. 801; MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 10, at 207; BEL-
LAMY, TREASON IN ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 138, 147-48; BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra
note 57, at 45-46, 84, 85-86, 121, 122, 252 n.4 (regarding coinage treasons); G. ELTON, supra
note 33, at 295, 298, 331-32, 344.
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services. In fact, their remuneration seems hardly worth the effort their po-
sition would have required. Justices of the peace actually "held their offices
for the importance and precedence [that office] gave and the leadership and
influence which accrued" from it in the place where they lived and not for
the paltry sum they received for each day they were in session.""
VIII. DEFENSE COUNSEL
Those accused of treason were denied benefit of defense counsel and
were thus without legal advice or assistance. The only exception was on
matters of procedure or points of law,10 5 but these had first to be raised by
the accused. The judge was expected to be mindful of the needs of the
accused by seeing to it that "the proceedings against him [were] legal and
strictly regular."' 06 It was thus for the court to ensure that conviction was
based on "evidence . . . so manifest, as it could not be contradicted.'
1 0 7
Consequently, it was believed "too dangerous an experiment, to let an advo-
cate try, whether [the evidence] could be contradicted or no[t]. ' s
Because treason often involved peers, gentry, or the middle class, the
strata of society most capable of paying for their defense as well the strata
most capable of bringing about a change in trial procedure, it would seem
that the legal profession would surely have found a way to practice as coun-
sel for a treason defendant. Such, however, did not occur until the end of
the seventeenth century when it was permitted by Act of Parliament.' 0 '
Previously, lawyers had looked "to preserve their good name and reputa-
tion," and defending one accused of treason apparently would have stained
both. 1 0 This was because the "Law abhor[red] the defence and mainte-
nance of bad Causes." If that was the posture of the law, then "a good
lawyer [could not] honestly undertake the defence of a foul and desperate
104. B. WILKINSON, supra note 38 at 326; See also MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY, supra note 10, at 207, where Maitland states their wages as four shillings for each day
while in session.
Research into the effectiveness and usefulness of justices of the peace in detecting treasons
and ferreting out traitors would seem particularly worthwhile.
105. 2 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 400 (1724); 4 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 349. For trial procedure see BELLAMY, TREASON IN
ENGLAND, supra note 2, at 265 (index); BELLAMY, TUDOR LAW, supra note 57, at ch. 4; G.
ELTON, supra note 33, at ch. 7; Marcus, The Tudor Treason Trials: Some Observations on
the Emergence of Forensic Themes, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 675.
106. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 349.
107. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 137.
108. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 17, at 349.
109. THE TREASON ACT, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3.
110. SIR JOHN DAVIES, LE PRIMER DISCOURS DES CASES ET MATTERS IN LEY RESOLVES
ET ADJUDGES EN LES COURTS DEL ROY EN CEST REALME 19-20 (law French 1615), reprinted
in 80 ENG. REP. 491-583 (9 K.B.) (trans. 1762) (preface to translation).
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Cause." Consequently, in this regard, it was because the profession ac-
cepted that it was to give "honour unto our Law," and not "to dishonour
themselves . . . by defending such Offendours," that those accused of trea-
son had to go it alone and meet the test by their own wits.
The method of proceedings at a trial for treason was clearly intended
to make counsel for the accused superfluous. The evidence was to be so
clear and convincing that it was impossible to overcome, and the court was
to ensure the legal sufficiency of the proceedings."' Such, at least, was the
theory, but the practice may have been another matter. At her execution in
1685, Alice Lisle said that what she received from the court was evidence
rather than advice."' It was likely to have been much the same throughout
the earlier period." 3
The absence of defense counsel would be most noticeable at the indict-
ment of a fugitive accused of treason, for with the accused absent, no voice
whatsoever would have been raised in his defense. With only Crown evi-
dence, testimony, and argument presented, the likelihood of a vera billa,
and thus of a declaration of outlawry, was a near certainty." 4
IX. CONCLUSION
By the end of the medieval period, treason had become a unilateral
breach by the vassal or citizen of his relationship with his king as sovereign.
That treason was no longer based on a bilateral relationship involving recip-
rocal privileges and responsibilities can be found in the seven heads of trea-
son memorialized in the Treason Act of 1352, for in every instance treason
is defined as activity aimed against the king or the majesty of govern-
ment. '" Later statutes, though they altered the scope of treason, confirmed
the essential definition. Only when successful would such a breach not be
I1. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES, supra note 14, at 137.
112. THE DYING SPEECHES OF SEVERALL EXCELLENT PERSONS WHO SUFFERED FOR
THEIR ZEALE AGAINST POPERY AND ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT 26 (1689), cited in Bodet, Sir
Edward Coke's Third Institutes: A Primer for Treason Defendants, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 469,
476 (1970).
113. Bodet, supra note 112, at 471: "In the seventeenth century prosecuting attorneys
customarily baited the defendant . . . and were more often joined than restrained by the pre-
siding judge." See also the materials for trial procedure, supra note 105.
114. See, e.g., the true bill of indictment of Tyrone, Tyrconnell, and their fellow fugi-
tives (1607) in Public Record Office, London, State Papers 63/223/2,1, and 2 CALENDAR OF
STATE PAPERS, IRELAND, JAMES I 555. See F. Harris, Matters Relating to the Indictments of
'the Fugitive Earls and their Principal Adherents', 18 THE IRISH JURIST (n.s.) 344 (1983);
also, a further paper by the present writer is currently being prepared on the topic of this
indictment.
115. I do not for a moment propose that the Act of 1352 was not the direct consequence
of a reaction against the vagueness of and lack of precision in the law of treason as it existed
prior to passage of the Act.
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treason, because, if successful, the king had to accept the breach (John and
the Magna Carta in 1215) or the breach resulted in the king's overthrow
(Richard II by Bolingbroke, Henry IV, in 1399) or his own execution
(Charles I by Parliament in 1649).
In the period under review, treason began in the economic setting of
feudalism, it developed within the framework of the economics of contract,
and its punishment was intended as payment by way of retribution for
breach. As the feudal and early modern state was tied to the economics of
feudalism, so too was the economics of feudalism tied to the law of treason.
In time, as the economics of the old medieval world faced the reality of new
and different circumstances, feudalism collapsed as the Middle Ages gave
way to the modern. The ruin of what remained of the feudal land law was
largely accomplished by the Restoration's Convention Parliament which
abolished the incidents of tenure in chivalry in 1660.116 With the alterations
of politics and society that came with the new age, treason as a concept
began to change so that eventually ideology rather than economics com-
prised its principle characteristic.
116. THE TENURES ABOLITION ACT, 1660, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24.
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